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UN High Commissioner for Hljlnm Rights
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Mr. Mautner-Markhof
Chief, Special Procedure!!
r
UN Human Rights CeJ!~,er'
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:
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ter .
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Subject:

Back-up for UN Senior OfficiaJ1s meeting :on Rwanda -Nov. 8, 1994

Date:

November 7, 1994

1.
Fil:st, my respect and appreciation for ~l,e rapid dispatoh of documentation relating
to tho presslr,_g needs noted in my 4 Novemller fa~~.. Thlli means we should he ahle to
exploit rapidly the progzess made by Georg Ma1..1tner-Markhof in Geneva. We can also
build on the solid human and material resbm<.:C fouhdation laid by Bill Cl=ncc's
leatl=hip in the field.

2.

Sumn1arv

point~

The follo•.ving obscn-ations arc forwarded as baCkground suppvr! for !he talking
Rill C:larence is submitting:
a. The hwnall righlll op~rdlional mandil.te of ymtr office fllls a maior gap in the
international humatlitarian community..
b. A successful Hu:nan Rights field operation ili Rwanda under this m~ndatc is
absolutely essential, both for thcsakc of Rwanda and for the fulur~ viability of your
office.

c. You bave been given an historic oppnthmity mmmpletne.ot and add value to your
UN opetational pati:ner agencies in ftie field -- through D.Bserting, and without
comprom.isi:1g, thQ mandate distinctive bf yuur office.
d. Priority emphasis must now be p!ac~d on sirengthcning the operaliuna! support
sioows i11 Geneva and Kigali, e~enr!~l to ac.complishing your -vital missioo in
Rwanda.
3.

Filling tlle Gap

Yow- mamlalc p~rlliins lo the rnnt cause'> of r.omplex lmmanitarian emergencies. No
other part of the UN, neither UNHCR nor the P!Jlitico.! Department, can address root causes
in the operational way with wltidt yuu are mandated. While the world comm.unity i; very
late in ~stablishir"! your office to help fill this gap, it is fortunately, but sndly, not too late.
There "-fe 21 other complcl\ huma;;itation emergencies besides Rwll!1ua; there are also,
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The Impemtive of Success ln Rwanda.

Hllm?.n Rights success in R1J1.11nda does not me4n that your offio~ succeeds in t~o
major task of put!i.!lg the country back together. Succosp for your .bffiC<> Ill Rw1.1.mla entmls
proper ~electlon. pr~:p~:~redness, training, and ~.quipping of hunian rights teams which
discharge maturely and professionally your three R~-speclfiQ' mandated duties:

a. Investiga.tion/documenmtlcm of acts of gen.oei~e.

b. IImnan rights monitoring to promot~: a diinate of confidence for return of
refugees and Internally displaced persons.

c. Capauily-builuing assistmioe for the administration of juStice.

Given this definition of success, then: i;; a strong chance )'lour mission in Rwanda
will succeed, To the extent you succeed in Rwanda, intemationnl respect nnd SUJl!lort for
your office in the futllr; will be proportionawly affected.
5.

Role on the Terun of UN Operational Agencies

The role of your office is both distinctive and o~mplementilr"J. Distinctive in that
your task is U!llque. not duplicatine or cvwpcti\1g with other l JN mandates.
Complementary, in that other tJN agencies need effective pertbrma.'lce from your office.
For example, the Refugee High Commissionllt needs yoi.l to deal with roul caUlles so as to
prevent or slop refugee floW!<, help create an environment fer repatriation, and to assist in
confidence-building which repatriation needs to endur¢. Your full partidp11.tion on the
lnteragoncy Standing Commlttee team is abo important - not re~st to insure that DHA
accords highest priority to funding your activities through tJN oonsolidated appeals.
6.

Slreey;!bwjng the Oner§tional 8HPJ2Q!! System

You took comrnendabl~ p~n;onal leadership In responding to intense pressure to
deploy rapidly a h = right$ presence in the field. You placed an cKpetienccd,
professional leader in the field. Dill Clarence, who bas m!u.l~ exlmordinary progress despite
llf"~l obstacles. Nnw lt is tlm~ to build on thls progress by insisting on:
a. Recruii.lng only experien~d .!ttaff which are already matured through extensive
field background and possessing good judgement wiih respect to human justice.
h. Preparing these recruits through a professionally directed preparedness progratn
i.'l. Geneva, followed by a further orientation prollram iu Kigali drawing on
cunl~mpura.'leous cases in the fleld.
c. A highly r~sponsivc administrativ" uapability in Geneva which draws on the
procurement competeMe ofexp~nced agencies such as UNHCR.

d. A highly professi'-'Ilal administrative capacity in Klg~U in the areas of personnel,
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f!lii1UCc, aud lollistics to permit optinuiJ pertormmQ$ from staff performing the three
operational functions in Rwtmda. A ~ood start 4as been made in the field, Geneva
headquarters needs to listen !IIld. re!lp()nd adeq1J4tely to field suggestions regardiuj:
requir~m~nts.
'

7.

Conclusion

It is gratifying to ~n!izl: that your on;ice eT\inys: both political support, and 110 fllf,
:fin1111cial support needed for the taqk !n R.W!lll<ila. 'ihe admtiollll! holp in administration !llld
lollistics know-how is beginning to materialiic. It is oow a matter of continuing to give
your personal, high level support to ruengthening the ~'ita! sinew~~ of professional human
rcsourc~.

prepa!"edness, and

logistic/~sti:ative

bCICk-up.

There must also be coorrnous personal satisfaction fur you. You axe advocating a
modest invesnnent which can bring extraordinary returns in reducing human misery and
cost to the international community for Rwanda today, and Rwanda-like situations
tomonvw.
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